The Return of the Plague:  Inequitable Conduct After Regeneron V. Merus by Avery, Matthew et al.
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 4 Article 1
5-1-2018
The Return of the Plague: Inequitable Conduct
After Regeneron V. Merus
Avery, Matthew
Kempf, Matthew
Liang, Amy
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Avery, Matthew; Kempf, Matthew; and Liang, Amy, The Return of the Plague: Inequitable Conduct After Regeneron V. Merus, 34 Santa
Clara High Tech. L.J. 328 (2018).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol34/iss4/1
  
 
328 
 
THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE: INEQUITABLE CONDUCT 
AFTER REGENERON V. MERUS 
Matthew Avery,† Matthew Kempf,‡ & Amy Liang§ 
In July 2017, the Federal Circuit decided Regeneron 
Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Merus, where a split panel upheld the district 
court’s decision to infer prosecution misconduct by Regeneron based 
on its subsequent litigation misconduct during the patent case, thus 
holding its patent unenforceable based on the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct. The decision raises new questions regarding the relevance 
of litigation misconduct to the unenforceability of a patent, which has 
traditionally been determined based upon evidence of misconduct 
before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (i.e., pre-litigation 
misconduct). The Regeneron decision also raises new questions 
regarding the standard of proof needed to establish inequitable 
conduct as a defense to patent infringement. In 2011, the Federal 
Circuit raised the bar for proving inequitable conduct in Therasense, 
Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., where an en banc panel held that 
clear and convincing evidence was needed to prove intent to deceive 
the USPTO, and that intent to deceive cannot be inferred by proving 
other elements of the defense. Prior to Therasense, claims of 
inequitable conduct were once so prevalent that the court wrote that 
the defense had “become an absolute plague” on patent litigation. By 
indicating that it is willing to consider litigation misconduct to infer a 
finding of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit appears to have 
expanded the scope of the doctrine, which may encourage defendants 
to raise inequitable conduct as a defense. If subsequent cases follow 
this expanded theory, the consequences could be far-reaching, 
exposing patent holders to a new wave of inequitable conduct 
charges. This Article examines the effect of Regeneron on the 
inequitable conduct defense and further discusses considerations for 
practitioners in light of the Federal Circuit’s opinion in Regeneron. 
                                                             
† Mr. Avery is a Senior Associate at Baker Botts LLP in San Francisco, California, and an 
Adjunct Professor at U.C. Hastings College of Law. 
‡ Mr. Kempf is an Associate at Baker Botts LLP in Palo Alto, California.  
§ Ms. Liang is an Associate at Baker Botts LLP in Palo Alto, California. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Under the patent law doctrine of inequitable conduct, a patent 
can be held unenforceable if a court finds that the patentee obtained 
the patent by engaging in improper conduct before the U.S. Patent 
and Trademark Office (USPTO).1 Once referred to as an “absolute 
plague” on the patent system by the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, inequitable conduct was routinely asserted by defendants in 
patent cases.2 Common examples of such conduct include making 
false statements to the patent office or intentionally withholding 
material information during prosecution.3 In 2011, the Federal Circuit 
issued an en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & 
Company, setting forth a heightened standard for proving inequitable 
conduct.4 To prove inequitable conduct under Therasense, a patent 
defendant must show that the patent applicant (1) withheld or 
misrepresented “but-for” material information, and (2) acted with 
specific intent to deceive the USPTO. A critical aspect of the 
Therasense holding is that specific intent must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence, and that such intent cannot be inferred merely 
because material information was withheld or misrepresented.5 Since 
this decision was handed down, use of the inequitable conduct 
defense in patent litigation has sharply dropped.6 
However, just six years later, the Federal Circuit issued an 
opinion that appears to have weakened the foundations of the 
Therasense standard. In July 2017, Chief Judge Prost issued a 
precedential opinion in Regeneron Pharmaceuticals v. Merus N.V., 
                                                             
 1. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 2. Id. at 1289 (where the court cited to a study that estimated eighty percent of patent 
infringement cases included allegations of inequitable conduct, and agreed that the defense “has 
been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent 
system.”); see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major patent case has 
become an absolute plague.”); Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“Left unfettered, the inequitable 
conduct doctrine has plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent system.”). Note, 
however, that the en banc court in Therasense heightened the standard for finding inequitable 
conduct, as discussed in more detail in Part II, infra. 
 3. See, e.g., Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Boehringer Ingelheim GMBH, 237 F.3d 1359, 1366 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (“To prove inequitable conduct in the prosecution of a patent, [the defendant] 
must have provided evidence of affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to 
disclose material information, or submission of false material information, coupled with an 
intent to deceive.”). 
 4. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 5. Id. at 1276. 
 6. Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360 
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://bit.do/law360_inequitableconduct. 
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which affirmed a finding of inequitable conduct without a finding of 
specific intent as was required by Therasense.7 In Regeneron, the 
patentee failed to disclose several prior art references to the USPTO 
during prosecution of the patent at issue, and the district court found 
these withheld references to be “but-for” material information.8 
However, the district court did not specifically determine whether the 
patentee acted with a specific intent to deceive the USPTO, but rather 
inferred intent to deceive primarily based on misconduct during 
discovery in the patent litigation proceedings.9 Based on this 
inference, the district court held the patent unenforceable.10 
Notwithstanding its prior holding in Therasense, that specific intent 
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed the Regeneron district court decision on appeal.11 
This Article explores the effects of Regeneron on inequitable 
conduct challenges, and whether it heralds a return of the “plague” to 
the patent system. Part I provides an overview of the doctrine of 
inequitable conduct under the Therasense standard, which requires a 
showing that the patent holder’s conduct was both material to 
patentability and done with the specific intent to deceive the patent 
office. Part II discusses several post-Therasense cases that illustrate 
how district courts and the Federal Circuit have applied the 
Therasense standard. Part III discusses how Regeneron appears to 
retreat from the heightened standard previously set by the Federal 
Circuit in Therasense. Part IV discusses several post-Regeneron cases 
that illustrate its impact on patent litigation. Finally, Part V provides 
strategic considerations for prosecution and litigation counsel for 
avoiding charges of inequitable conduct. 
                                                             
 7. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus N.V., 864 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) [hereinafter 
Regeneron II]. 
 8. Regeneron Pharm., Inc. v. Merus B.V., 144 F. Supp. 3d 530, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) 
[hereinafter Regeneron I], aff’d sub nom. Regeneron II. 
 9. Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 561, 595-96 (“An inference of intent to deceive is 
appropriate where the applicant engages in ‘a pattern of lack of candor’ including where the 
applicant repeatedly makes factual representations ‘contrary to the true information he had in his 
possession.’” Regeneron had shown “a long pattern of litigation choices that [had] caused delay, 
inefficient use of resources, and diversion from the merits.” “The Court therefore infers that Drs. 
Smeland and Murphy together knew of each of the Withheld References, knew they were 
material, and made a deliberate decision to withhold them. In short, they acted with the specific 
intent to deceive the patent office. The Court finds that this is ‘the single most reasonable 
inference able to be drawn from the evidence.’”). 
 10. Id. at 596. 
 11. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364 (“[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion by 
drawing an adverse inference of Regeneron’s specific intent to deceive the PTO. Thus, the 
district court did not abuse its discretion in holding the ‘018 patent unenforceable due to 
Regeneron’s inequitable conduct.”). 
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I. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT UNDER THERASENSE 
Inequitable conduct is an affirmative defense in patent litigation, 
in which the defendant asserts that the patentee obtained its patent 
through improper conduct before the USPTO.12 This judicially-
created doctrine originated from a trio of Supreme Court cases 
dealing with the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.13 Prior to the 
development of the inequitable conduct doctrine, a patentee who had 
engaged in egregious misconduct, and thus came to the court with 
“unclean hands,” would often be denied an injunction against the 
alleged infringer.14 The modern inequitable conduct defense is 
tantamount to an accusation of fraud on the USPTO, and the 
consequences are much more severe. If the defense is proven, the 
entire patent (and possibly all related patents in the same family) can 
be held unenforceable, even if the claims of the patent are otherwise 
valid.15 In fact, a finding of inequitable conduct may jeopardize a 
company’s entire patent portfolio, and may even give rise to 
additional antitrust and unfair competition claims.16 The effects of 
such a finding are so severe that the Federal Circuit, in Therasense, 
referred to the doctrine as an “atomic bomb,” and elevated the 
standard of what must be shown to prove the defense.17 
As obtaining a patent is an ex parte procedure, all persons 
substantively involved in the prosecution of the patent application 
owe a duty of candor to the USPTO to disclose all known information 
                                                             
 12. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285. 
 13. Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240 (1993); Hazel-Atlas 
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. 
Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).  
 14. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287. 
 15. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 877 (Fed. Cir. 
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex. Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1984); see, e.g., 
Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 808-12 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
Inequitable conduct committed in prosecution of one patent may render related patents 
unenforceable as well. Generally, an “intimate relation” between the patents or an “immediate 
and necessary relation” between the inequitable conduct and the second patent is required to 
render the second patent unenforceable. See Newell Window Furnishings, Inc. v. Springs 
Window Fashions Div., Inc., 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1302, 1321, 1328, 1999 WL 1077882 (N.D. Ill. 
1999), judgment aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 15 Fed. Appx. 836 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (reversed on factual grounds). 
 16. See Dow Chemical Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (where 
inequitable conduct gave rise to an unfair competition claim); Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. 
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965) (where inequitable conduct gave rise to 
antitrust action); see also Gregory Michael et al., The New Plague: False Claims Liability Based 
on Inequitable Conduct During Patent Prosecution, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 747 (2015). 
 17. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (citations omitted). 
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material to patentability.18 Acts typically constituting inequitable 
conduct include failing to submit material prior art known by the 
applicant, failing to explain references written in a foreign language, 
misstatements of facts concerning patentability, and misstatements of 
inventorship.19 To prove inequitable conduct post-Therasense, an 
accused infringer must show by clear and convincing evidence that 
the patentee either failed to disclose, misrepresented, or submitted 
false information to the patent office (1) that was material to 
patentability and (2) with the specific intent to deceive the patent 
office.20 Materiality and intent are separate elements that the 
defendant must prove, and the Therasense court made clear that the 
existence of one cannot provide the basis for inferring the other.21 
Proving that a reference was material and not submitted to the 
USPTO, for example, does not by itself prove specific intent to 
deceive the USPTO.22 
Under Therasense, the defendant must show but-for materiality 
with respect to the patentee’s omission or misrepresentation to the 
patent office.23 Therefore, even when a patentee withholds 
information, it only warrants a finding of inequitable conduct if, “but-
for” the withholding, the patentee would not have been successful in 
                                                             
 18. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office … [All persons 
involved in the patent application owe] a duty to disclose to the Office all information known to 
that individual to be material to patentability as defined in this section.”). 
 19. See McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 913-26 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct where attorney failed to disclose material 
information from related patent application); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular 
Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (inferring intent where applicant “knew 
or should have known” that information was relevant to the prosecution); Bruno Indep. Living 
Aids, Inc. v. Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1350-54 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding 
inequitable conduct for failure to cite an FDA proceeding); Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., 
476 F.3d 1359, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (finding inequitable conduct for failing to disclose test 
data inconsistent with data disclosed in the specification); Ferring B.V. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 437 
F.3d 1181, 1194-95 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (finding inequitable conduct where applicant failed to 
disclose that declarations from outside experts had been previously employed by the applicant); 
Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 504 F.3d 1223, 1229-30 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (inequitable conduct 
found where applicant improperly claimed small entity status). 
 20. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1350-51. 
 21. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (rejecting the “sliding scale” approach where a court 
requires less evidence of intent where a reference is highly material). 
 22. See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1366 (Fed. 
Cir. 2008) (where the court emphasized that clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent 
must be shown as a threshold matter, even if by circumstantial evidence, otherwise a court 
“cannot hold the patent unenforceable regardless of the relative equities or how it might balance 
them.”). 
 23. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
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prosecuting the claim.24 However, in heightening the standard to but-
for materiality, the Therasense court carved out an exception in cases 
of affirmative egregious misconduct.25 Where a patent applicant has 
engaged in egregious misconduct during prosecution, the materiality 
prong is met regardless of whether the claim would have issued.26 
Examples of affirmative acts of egregious misconduct include 
intentionally filing false affidavits, failing to cure a false affidavit, 
and making false representations to the USPTO’s patent appeals 
board.27 In heightening the standard for what constitutes “egregious” 
conduct, the Therasense court made it clear that merely failing to 
disclose prior art references, even those that are “but-for” material, 
does not necessarily constitute such misconduct.28 
The second element of the inequitable conduct analysis requires 
proving that the patentee acted with specific intent to deceive the 
USPTO, in that the “evidence must show that the applicant made a 
deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.”29 
Specifically, “the defendant must prove that the patentee deliberately 
decided to withhold, misrepresent, or falsify information to the 
USPTO.”30 This element, which must be proven with clear and 
convincing evidence, poses a significant hurdle for defendants, with 
courts describing this high burden as an “insurmountable standard” 
that “severely limit[s] the ability of district court judges to make 
inferences based on the evidence.”31 However, the Therasense court 
                                                             
 24. Id. (a prior art reference is “but-for material if the PTO would not have allowed a 
claim had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”). 
 25. Id. at 1292 (carving out an exception for cases where a patentee “deliberately planned 
and carefully executed scheme[s]” to defraud the USPTO). 
 26. See Regeneron I, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 582, 585 (where the District Court found that, 
even though each of the four withheld references met the rigorous “but for” materiality standard, 
Regeneron’s conduct during prosecution also amounted to “egregious misconduct,” even 
“without need for application of an adverse inference”). 
 27. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292 (“When the patentee has engaged in affirmative acts of 
egregious misconduct, such as the filing of an unmistakably false affidavit, the misconduct is 
material.”). 
 28. Id. at 1287, 1290-91 (“As the inequitable conduct doctrine evolved … it came to 
embrace a broader scope of misconduct, including not only egregious affirmative acts of 
misconduct … but also the mere nondisclosure of information to the PTO.” “This court now 
tightens the standards for finding both intent and materiality … [t]he absence of a good faith 
explanation for withholding a material reference does not, by itself, prove intent to deceive.”). 
 29. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (quoting Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 
1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995)). 
 30. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290. 
 31. General Elec. Co. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., 946 F. Supp. 2d 582, 590-91 
(N.D. Tex. 2013) (stating that it was reluctantly ruling there was no inequitable conduct for not 
disclosing prior art that the court considered to be material because of insufficient evidence of 
intent to deceive). 
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stated that such intent can be inferred from indirect and circumstantial 
evidence, provided that such an inference is “the single most 
reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence.”32 The 
evidence presented must, therefore, be “sufficient to require a finding 
of deceitful intent in the light of all the circumstances.”33 A patentee’s 
deceptive intent, therefore, cannot be inferred where multiple 
reasonable inferences may be drawn from the same evidence.34  
By heightening the standards for both materiality and specific 
intent, the Therasense court hoped to “redirect a doctrine that has 
been overused to the detriment of the public.”35 However, others 
maintain that it has become too difficult to successfully raise an 
inequitable conduct defense, and that Therasense improperly restricts 
the discretion of district courts.36 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF INEQUITABLE CONDUCT AFTER 
THERASENSE 
Prior to Therasense, inequitable conduct was raised as a defense 
in nearly every patent litigation.37 But the new standard made is so 
difficult to prove inequitable conduct that it is now rarely raised as a 
defense, and even more rarely successful.38 Proving that a plaintiff 
had intentionally withheld prior art from the USPTO has been an 
exceedingly burdensome challenge that few defendants have been 
able to meet.39 Additionally, under the new heightened standard for 
materiality, it has been difficult to show that the patent would not 
have issued “but for” the undisclosed reference. Practitioners 
described the inequitable conduct defense before Therasense as a 
“way to punish patent holders any time they made a mistake during 
prosecution, regardless of its significance,” but after Therasense, it 
has evolved into a “way to punish people who knowingly deceived 
the patent office in a way that affects the outcome of the patent . . . a 
much smaller category of conduct.”40 
                                                             
 32. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290 (“Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rare, a 
district court may infer intent from indirect and circumstantial evidence.”) (citing Larson Mfg. 
Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
 33. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 873 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (emphasis added). 
 34. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290-91. 
 35. Id. at 1290. 
 36. Ryan Davis, Inequitable Conduct a Dying Defense 2 Years Post-Therasense, LAW360 
(May 23, 2013, 9:13 PM), http://bit.do/law360_inequitableconduct. 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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A. But-For Materiality After Therasense 
In Therasense, the Federal Circuit explained that a defendant 
must prove “but-for” materiality to support an inequitable conduct 
defense because “this doctrine should only be applied in instances 
where the patentee’s misconduct resulted in the unfair benefit of 
receiving an unwarranted claim.”41 Courts have hewed closely to this 
standard and considered not only the technical disclosures that were 
withheld or misrepresented, but also the patent examination standards 
of the USPTO.42 
The most common “but-for” material action is failing to disclose 
printed references to the USPTO. For instance, in American Calcar v. 
American Honda, the patentee described a prior art reference in the 
background section of its patent application, but this background 
description failed to discuss critical features disclosed in the prior art 
that were similar to features claimed in the patent.43 While the 
patentee presented strong evidence against but-for materiality—the 
validity of one of the patents-at-issue over the information at issue 
had been upheld during an ex parte reexamination at the USPTO—
the district court nonetheless found inequitable conduct.44 The district 
court opined that the inventor failed to disclose critical aspects of the 
prior art that were relied on to distinguish over the cited prior art, and 
also that the “only reasonable inference from the evidence” was that 
the patentee had withheld the information with “specific intent to 
deceive the PTO.”45 The Federal Circuit affirmed on this same 
basis.46 Judge Newman dissented, reasoning that the withheld prior 
art could not be but-for material because the USPTO considered the 
very same art during reexamination and still allowed the claims.47 The 
majority did not address this point, presumably finding that since the 
reexamination did not address the two patents for which the finding of 
inequitable conduct was made, the reexamination was not relevant. 
The appellate court held that the withheld prior art could still be 
considered a but-for cause of the patent issuing in the first place 
                                                             
 41. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1292. 
 42. See, e.g., Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 
2014). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., No. 06CV2433 DMS KSC, 2012 WL 
1328640, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2012), aff’d, 768 F.3d 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
 46. Am. Calcar, 768 F.3d at 1185. 
 47. Id. at 1192 (Newman, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority had distorted the 
Therasense standards, and had “ignored the PTO reexamination, cast[ed] the jury aside, and 
generally disregard[ed] the safeguards that this court adopted en banc.”). 
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because the USPTO only requires rejections to be supported by a 
preponderance of evidence, a much lower standard than the clear and 
convincing evidence required to invalidate an issued patent in court.48 
Though not directly addressing Judge Newman’s concerns, the 
majority’s ruling seems to imply that the USPTO would have found at 
least one of the claims obvious under the lower preponderance-of-
evidence standard if it had seen the withheld prior art during its initial 
examination.49 
Failure to submit physical samples of a prior art product to the 
USPTO can also be but-for material. For example, in Worldwide 
Home Products, Inc. v. Bed, Bath and Beyond, Inc. the district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the 
case and finding that the patent at issue was unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct because the patentee misrepresented a prior art 
product and withheld physical samples of the product from the patent 
office.50 The omission of the product sample was found to be but-for 
material in view of the examiner’s statements in the prosecution 
history of the patent.51 During prosecution, Worldwide’s patent 
attorney had submitted low-resolution photographs of the prior art 
product, which were not clear enough show the claimed features.52 
After considering the photographs, the examiner allowed 
Worldwide’s patent application, mistakenly stating that the photos did 
not show the claimed features.53 The court found the withheld 
samples to be but-for material because they embodied the exact 
features that the patentee had claimed and the examiner had agreed 
were patentable.54 
A number of scenarios may be relevant to and raise questions of 
fact regarding but-for materiality of a withheld reference or 
misleading act. For instance, in Masimo Corp. v. Philips Electric 
North America Corp., the patentee failed to disclose a district court’s 
claim interpretation that contradicted the patentee’s position in a 
reexamination proceeding.55 Specifically, the district court had 
                                                             
 48. Id. 
 49. Am. Calcar, 768 F.3d at 1188-89. 
 50. Worldwide Home Prod., Inc. v. Bed, Bath & Beyond, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 626, 638 
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d, Worldwide Home Prod., Inc. v. Time, Inc., 626 F. App’x 1009 (Fed. 
Cir. 2015). 
 51. Id. at 630-31. 
 52. Id. at 629. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 638. 
 55. Masimo Corp. v. Philips Elec. North Am. Corp., No. cv 09-80-LPS-MPT, 2014 WL 
4365191, *4 (D. Del. Sept. 2, 2014). 
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construed the claims to require that the claimed calculators actually 
determined a particular ratio, but during prosecution the patentee 
argued the opposite—that the claimed calculators do not require 
calculating the particular ratio.56 While the “broadest reasonable 
construction” standard used during reexamination was broader than 
the claim construction standard applied during litigation, the court 
found the patentee’s failure to disclose the prior claim construction 
was sufficient to support a finding of inequitable conduct.57  
Lastly, not all omissions or misrepresentations are “but-for” 
material, even if they are directly relevant to the claimed inventive 
limitation that was in dispute during prosecution. In Novo Nordisk A/S 
v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Labs., Ltd., the patentee submitted a 
misleading declaration that omitted relevant facts, and the prosecuting 
attorney made misleading statements about the declaration.58 The 
examiner stated that “[b]ased solely on the [d]eclaration,” the 
rejection of certain claims was withdrawn.59 Specifically, the patent 
claimed a method of treatment that utilized the synergistic effect of a 
combination of two drugs.60 To overcome the examiner’s rejection 
that the synergies and combination therapies were well-known in the 
art, the applicant submitted an expert declaration regarding results of 
the expert’s study of the efficacy of the claimed drug combination in 
obese rats.61 The prosecuting attorney asserted that the declaration 
showed clear evidence of synergy as well as surprising results of the 
two drug combination for treatment of Type II diabetes.62 However, 
the patentee and attorney had omitted other remarks by the expert 
regarding the fact that the expert’s test results did not necessarily 
translate to treatment of Type II diabetes in humans.63 Nonetheless, 
the Federal Circuit found that while the omissions and misleading 
statements were “troubling,” they were not “but-for” material because 
the expert’s test protocols were disclosed to the examiner and the 
attorney “employed carefully-chosen language which tracked the 
qualified nature” of the expert’s opinion.64 
                                                             
 56. Id. at *3-*4. 
 57. Id. at *2. 
 58. Novo Nordisk A/S v. Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd., 775 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1022 (E.D. 
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The Therasense court recognized that the doctrine of inequitable 
conduct originated from the doctrine of unclean hands. To continue to 
deter patentees and applicants from committing bad acts, the Court 
created an “egregious misconduct” exception to the requirement of 
“but-for” materiality. That is, if the patent defendant shows that the 
patent holder committed egregious misconduct during prosecution, 
then the defendant need not prove “but-for” materiality because 
materiality would be presumed based on the conduct.65  
The Federal Circuit applied this exception in Intellect Wireless, 
Inc. v. HTC Corp., where an inventor submitted “unmistakably false” 
declarations to the USPTO during the prosecution of the patent-at-
issue and other patents in the same family.66 The applicant submitted 
declarations to the USPTO falsely swearing that it had actually 
reduced its invention to practice on a specific date when, in fact, it 
had not.67 The prosecution attorney “quickly” submitted a revised 
declaration in which it purportedly cured the misrepresentation, but 
which the court found only “obfuscated the truth” because it never 
expressly negated the misrepresentation.68 Consequently, even though 
the false declarations where not technically but-for material because 
of the revised declarations, the Federal Circuit still affirmed a finding 
of inequitable conduct.69 The Court found that the patentee engaged 
in “affirmative egregious misconduct,” which rendered the false 
declarations material.70 
The Court rebuked the patentee for failing to “expressly advise 
the PTO of [the misrepresentation’s] existence, stating specifically 
wherein it resides.”71 Further, “if the misrepresentation is of one or 
more facts, the PTO [must] be advised what the actual facts are.”72 
Finally, the applicant must  
take the necessary action . . . openly. It does not suffice that 
one knowing of misrepresentations in an application or in its 
prosecution merely supplies the examiner with accurate facts 
without calling his attention to the untrue or misleading 
assertions sought to be overcome, leaving him to formulate 
                                                             
 65. See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1292-93 (Fed. Cir. 
2011). 
 66. Intellect Wireless, Inc. v. HTC Corp., 732 F.3d 1339, 1342-43 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1343. 
 69. Id. at 1346. 
 70. Id. at 1344. 
 71. Id. at 1343 (quoting Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem. Co., 722 F.2d 1556, 1572 
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 72. Intellect Wireless, 732 F.3d. 
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his own conclusions.73  
The Court concluded that the applicant had not met these 
requirements, and “rather than expressly admitting the earlier falsity, 
dance[d] around the truth.”74 Intellect Wireless demonstrates that 
deceitful misconduct can result in unenforceability of the patent-in-
question, even when but-for materiality is not directly proven.  
B. Specific Intent to Deceive After Therasense 
The Federal Circuit made clear that Therasense heightened the 
standard for proving intent. For example, in 1st Media, LLC v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc.,75 the court reiterated that it was not enough to 
show “carelessness, lack of attention, poor docketing or cross-
referencing or anything else that might be considered negligent or 
even grossly negligent.”76 Rather, to sustain a charge of inequitable 
conduct, “clear and convincing evidence must show that the applicant 
made a deliberate decision to withhold a known material reference.”77  
In 1st Media, the named inventor and his attorney withheld from 
the USPTO three material references and information about rejections 
in two related applications.78 The prosecuting attorney testified that 
his usual practice was to provide the USPTO with all relevant prior 
art references, and also testified that he did not remember why he did 
not disclose one of the prior art references and that his failure to do so 
must have been an oversight.79 The district court found the testimony 
not to be credible, and thereby inferred the requisite intent to 
deceive.80 However, the Federal Circuit reversed, concluding that the 
evidence was inadequate to sustain the burden because there was no 
evidence of a deliberate decision to withhold those references from 
the patent office, as required under Therasense.81 In essence, 1st 
Media held that even if a withheld reference is material, a court 
cannot simply infer intent to deceive, but instead must have actual 
evidence of such intent. 
                                                             
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 1345. 
 75. 694 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 76. 1st Media, LLC v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 694 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 77. Id. at 1372. 
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Likewise, the lack of evidence of specific intent to deceive in 
Hospira, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc. compromised the defendant’s ability to 
establish inequitable conduct.82 In Hospira, a table in the patent 
specification contained erroneous data.83 The prosecution history 
indicated that the examiner relied on the data and the patentee’s 
argument based on that data to find the claims allowable, thus making 
the error but-for material.84 However, because the inventor could not 
recall whether the corrected data had been submitted to his patent 
department, the court was unable to find that the applicant had a 
specific intent to deceive the USPTO.85 Accordingly, the court 
refused to find that patentee committed inequitable conduct.86 
Despite the high bar for proving intent, the Federal Circuit has 
affirmed several findings of inequitable conduct after Therasense. For 
example, in Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed a 
finding of clear and convincing evidence of specific intent to deceive 
where the inventor misrepresented the nature of an existing drug 
already on the market to the USPTO, withheld relevant prior art, and 
misrepresented that he had conducted experiments relevant to the 
invention.87 The lower court held that the patent was unenforceable, 
opining that the case involved “an orchestrated scheme to deceptively 
obtain a patent” and was “illustrative of inventive litigation as 
opposed to the scientific discovery that the patent laws were designed 
to promote.”88 On appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed that there was 
clear and convincing evidence that the inventor knowingly omitted 
important details regarding the prior art and made knowing 
misrepresentations of material facts in order to overcome rejections 
from the USPTO, and based on that evidence, affirmed that the single 
most reasonable inference was that the inventor had specific intent to 
deceive the PTO.89 The inventor’s specific intent to deceive the 
USPTO regarding but-for material facts rendered the patent 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.90 
                                                             
 82. Hospira, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., No. 09-4591 (MCL), 2012 WL 1587688 (D.N.J. May 4, 
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In TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co. (Fed. Cir. 
2016), the Federal Circuit upheld the lower court finding of 
inequitable conduct where the patentee and its in-house counsel 
knowingly misrepresented the nature of the prior art.91 During 3M’s 
prosecution of the patent-at-issue, the examiner initially allowed all 
claims.92 3M then submitted a sample of defendant TransWeb’s prior 
art product, which it had received at an expo more than one year 
before 3M’s priority filing date.93 In response, the examiner reversed 
his position and rejected the claims as obvious in view of TransWeb’s 
product.94 3M traversed this rejection by arguing that TransWeb’s 
prior art was only available under a confidentiality agreement, and 
thus was not prior art, which caused the examiner to withdraw the 
rejection.95 However, numerous emails and other evidence showed 
that 3M was actually “very much aware” that TransWeb’s product 
had been publicly displayed, and that it intentionally chose to 
withhold this fact from the examiner in order to overcome rejection.96 
Additionally, 3M’s in-house counsel “undertook an intentional 
scheme to paper over the potentially prior art nature” of its TransWeb 
samples that a 3M collaborator (and later subsidiary) had received 
from TransWeb one month after the expo.97 This evidence supported 
both the materiality and specific intent prongs of the inequitable 
conduct standard under Therasense.98 These cases show that, although 
Therasense raised the bar for proving inequitable conduct, patentees 
that make clear lies or misrepresentations to the USPTO can still be 
punished by the court. 
  
                                                             
 91. TransWeb, LLC v. 3M Innovative Properties Co., 812 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 
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C. State of the Law Just Before Regeneron 
In the months leading up to Regeneron, courts continued to 
apply the heightened Therasense standard and continued to look for 
evidence of specific intent to deceive the USPTO during the 
prosecution of disputed patents.  
For example, in Asghari-Kamrani v. United Services Automobile 
Association, the district court refused to find specific intent to deceive 
when there were plausible alternative explanations for the alleged 
misconduct.99 The patent owner in Asghari-Kamrani claimed 
continuation priority within a patent family, thereby avoiding 
rejections based on disclosures in its earlier-filed patent 
applications.100 During litigation, evidence showed that the patents 
were continuations-in-part rather than continuations as claimed on the 
applications and the face of the issued patents.101 However, multiple 
witnesses testified that the patent owner had hired a series of different 
patent counsel to draft and file the applications of the patent family 
due to cost concerns, and that the misstatement of priority may have 
been inadvertent.102 The district court refused to find inequitable 
conduct because, “where a plausible alternative explanation that does 
not go to inequitable conduct also exists, a court cannot find a specific 
intent to deceive.”103 
Similarly, in Barry v. Medtronic, Inc., the district court did not 
find a specific intent to deceive where there were multiple reasonable 
explanations for why the patentee failed to correct a mistake during 
prosecution.104 The defendant in Barry alleged inequitable conduct in 
part based on the fact that the patent holder submitted an inaccurate 
figure and withheld more accurate figures of the invention.105 The 
court found no specific intent to deceive and, as a result, no 
inequitable conduct.106 Specifically, the evidence showed that the 
patent applicants had images that supported the invention and that 
they could have submitted at the time of prosecution and did submit 
those corrected images when they discovered the error.107 Of a 
number of reasonable inferences that could be drawn to explain the 
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patentee’s submission of the wrong figure, the court found intent to 
deceive the USPTO less plausible than other explanations.108 
Courts have also required clear and convincing evidence of 
specific intent to deceive the USPTO when the charge of inequitable 
conduct is based on actions by the patentee during inter partes review 
proceedings. For example, in UUSI, LLC v. United States, the 
defendant argued that the patent owner had committed egregious 
misconduct during the prosecution of the patent by misrepresenting 
the expiration date of two patent claims during the institution stage of 
an inter partes review of the patent.109 In the inter partes review, the 
difference in expiration dates may have impacted whether the claims 
were construed more narrowly under Phillips standard if the claims 
were expired or under the broadest reasonable interpretation standard 
if the claims had not expired.110 However, the patent owner’s actions 
“lacked the requisite indicia of fraud or unmistakable falsehood” 
required to show affirmative egregious misconduct.111 The court 
concluded that  
[a]n erroneous and ill-conceived argument about the 
expiration date of two patent claims, fully aired before the 
PTAB and rejected by that tribunal, is a far cry from the type 
of misconduct courts have found to be inherently egregious 
such as perjury, bribery or manufacturing evidence.112  
Because the defendant did not otherwise show “but-for” materiality, 
the court dismissed the defendant’s inequitable conduct claims.113 
UUSI shows that even misconduct during the litigation-like inter 
partes review is judged under the same standards as in Therasense. 
Critically, the misconduct in UUSI was not used to infer specific 
intent to deceive the USPTO for purposes of showing inequitable 
conduct.  
III. REGENERON AND THE POTENTIAL RETREAT FROM 
THERASENSE 
A. The Regeneron District Court Decision 
In March 2014, Regeneron sued Merus for infringing U.S. Patent 
Number 8,502,018 (the ’018 patent), which relates to targeting and 
                                                             
 108. Id. at 805-06.  
 109. UUSI, LLC v. United States, 133 Fed. Cl. 263 (2017). 
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modifying endogenous genes and chromosomal loci in eukaryotic 
cells.114 Only claim 1 of the patent was at issue, which recited “[a] 
genetically modified mouse, comprising in its germline human 
rearranged variable region gene segments inserted at an endogenous 
mouse immunoglobulin locus.”115 In essence, the patent claims a 
particular kind of genetically modified mouse used for scientific 
research, which allows users to “target and modify specific genes in 
mice so that the mice develop antibodies that can be used by 
humans.”116  
Merus asserted that the patent was unenforceable due to 
inequitable conduct, in that Regeneron’s patent attorneys intentionally 
withheld four references (Brüggemann, Wood, Taki, and Zou) from 
the PTO during prosecution of the ’018 patent that were material to 
patentability.117 Regeneron did not dispute that it knew of the 
references, or that it failed to disclose them, but rather argued that the 
references “were not but-for material, that they were cumulative of 
references the PTO actually relied on during prosecution, and that [it] 
did not have any specific intent to deceive the PTO.”118 A third-party 
cited these references during prosecution of a related application after 
Regeneron received a Notice of Allowance for the ’018 patent.119 
Regeneron did not submit these references in the application that 
became the ’018 patent, but did in all other related applications that 
were pending.120 The district court also noted a purported irregularity 
in prosecution of the ’018 patent, where Regeneron’s counsel made 
representations that a transgenic mouse had been produced in 
accordance with the claims, and yielded surprising results.121 In fact, 
the evidence was “overwhelming” that no such mouse existed at the 
time the application was filed.122 Before even addressing application 
of an adverse inference, the court found “by clear and convincing 
evidence, and without need for application of an adverse inference, 
that Regeneron made false and misleading statements” and found “by 
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clear and convincing evidence that this constitutes egregious 
affirmative misconduct.”123 
However, the court decided to address Regeneron’s 
“questionable conduct” and numerous “shenanigans” in light of 
Regeneron’s pattern of, among other things, choosing “tactics over 
substance.”124 It was Regeneron’s sword and shield use of attorney-
client privilege, asserting and waiving the privilege when most 
beneficial, that inspired the court to issue sanctions.125 Regeneron 
asserted the privilege during discovery to shield documents relating to 
the patent’s prosecution, making it more difficult for Merus to prove 
its inequitable conduct defense, and then tried to “have it both ways at 
trial” by submitting the same info contained in those documents in the 
form of witness affidavits when it strongly supported their position at 
trial.126 In fact, the court’s in camera review of Regeneron’s 
privileged log revealed a “Pandora’s Box” of serious discovery 
issues, including numerous non-privileged documents related to 
topics at issue throughout the litigation withheld on the basis of 
privilege, and other documents that should have been produced 
pursuant to an earlier order from the court.127 Due to the extent and 
depth of Regeneron’s pattern of misconduct, the court felt that 
ordinary sanctions (such as striking the affidavits and precluding the 
witness testimony) would not suffice to remedy the many broad 
issues that had spread throughout the case.128 Instead, after carefully 
considering the issue, the court determined that the appropriate 
remedy for the litigation conduct was to draw an adverse inference of 
a specific intent to deceive the USPTO, and thereby found that 
Regeneron had engaged in inequitable conduct in connection with 
prosecution of the ’018 Patent.129  
B. The Regeneron Federal Circuit Opinion 
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, and held that it had not abused its discretion under regional 
circuit law by imposing an adverse inference of specific intent to 
deceive because of, among other things, litigation misconduct during 
efforts to enforce the ’018 patent.130 The court addressed both 
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materiality and intent, finding that Regeneron’s litigation misconduct 
was properly used to infer inequitable conduct, rendering the ’018 
patent unenforceable.131 
1. Materiality 
On appeal, Regeneron argued that none of the withheld 
references were but-for material to the prosecution of the ’018 patent, 
and that the District Court had therefore erred in finding otherwise.132 
The Federal Circuit, however, disagreed. Following Therasense, it 
defined the materiality required to establish inequitable conduct as 
“but-for materiality,” and emphasized that an alleged infringer can 
show but-for materiality “if the PTO would not have allowed a claim 
had it been aware of the undisclosed prior art.”133 To determine 
materiality, the Court reiterated, a court “place[s] itself in the shoes of 
a patent examiner” and therefore “applies the preponderance of the 
evidence standard and gives the claims their broadest reasonable 
construction.”134 After addressing each of the four withheld 
references, the Circuit agreed with the District Court and found that it 
did not clearly err in finding the references but-for material and not 
cumulative, and that “had the reference(s) been before the examiner at 
the time,” the claims of the ’018 patent would not have been allowed 
to issue.135  
Recall that the four withheld references were Brüggemann, 
Wood, Taki, and Zou.136 Regeneron argued that the Brüggemann 
reference was not but-for material because, according to its narrow 
construction, it did “not disclose a reverse-chimeric mouse.”137 
However, since the Circuit did not adopt Regeneron’s narrow 
construction, and instead did not limit the construction of Claim 1 to 
only reverse-chimeric mice, it found that the District Court did not 
clearly err in finding the reference but-for material.138 As to the other 
three withheld references, the Court reviewed the references 
themselves, the testimony of Merus’ expert witnesses, and the finding 
of the lower court before ultimately concluding that “the references 
both individually and in combination teach one of skill in the art to 
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genetically modify mice by inserting exogenous, including human, 
variable region gene segments endogenously into a mouse 
immunoglobulin locus.”139 The Circuit also found two of the withheld 
references (Taki and Zou) but-for material at least partially because 
they provided “the motivation to combine these references to develop 
the genetically modified mouse.”140 
Regeneron also argued that even if the withheld references were 
but-for material, at least three of those references (Brüggemann, Taki, 
and Zou) were cumulative of others considered by the Examiner 
during the ’018 patent’s prosecution.141 Importantly, if a reference is 
merely cumulative, the reference cannot be but-for material.142 A 
patent owner can show that a reference is cumulative if the reference 
“teaches no more than what a reasonable examiner would consider to 
be taught by the prior art already before the PTO.”143 After 
considering each of the three potentially cumulative References, the 
Court found that they were in fact not cumulative, and therefore did 
not preclude the District Court’s finding of materiality.144 
2. Intent to Deceive 
In response to Merus’ counterclaim of unenforceability due to 
inequitable conduct against Regeneron, the District Court indicated it 
would bifurcate the trial based on the two elements of the claim, 
conducting one bench trial focused on the element of materiality, and 
another focused on intent.145 However, the court only finished the first 
bench trial regarding materiality—it never held the second bench trail 
to address the Regeneron’s specific intent.146 Instead, after the first 
bench trial, the District Court extensively discussed Regeneron’s 
discovery misconduct occurring throughout litigation, and as a 
sanction for this misconduct, drew an adverse inference of specific 
intent to deceive the USPTO.147 The Federal Circuit agreed that the 
District Court was within its broad discretion to “fashion[] an 
appropriate sanction, including the discretion to . . . proceed with a 
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trial and give an adverse inference instruction . . . [when] sanctioning 
parties for violating discovery obligations.”148 Therefore, it found that 
the lower court’s decision to forego the second part of the bifurcated 
trial on inequitable conduct, and to draw an adverse inference of 
intent to deceive, was not an abuse of discretion.149  
On appeal, Regeneron did not “meaningfully dispute any of the 
factual findings underlying the district court’s decision.”150 As 
previously discussed, those findings included improperly withholding 
and citing on privilege logs documents clearly not privileged (such as 
experimental data), withholding as privileged information where the 
privilege had been waived, and withholding evidence of patent 
prosecution counsels’ reasoning and state of mind relevant to whether 
counsel had an intent to deceive.151 Regeneron did not dispute that it 
had engaged in this litigation misconduct, but rather asserted that the 
court’s imposed sanction was an abuse of discretion, amounting to not 
merely a sanction but rather to a finding of unenforceability, or even a 
dismissal.152 The Federal Circuit disagreed, and emphasized that the 
“widespread litigation misconduct” was tied directly to evidence 
relevant to the intent inquiry.153 It noted that the litigation misconduct 
directly affected the ability of both Merus and the court to determine 
Regeneron’s intent with respect to the withheld references, and also 
clarified that the sanction imposed only established the element of 
intent, and “[o]nly after Merus proved the remaining elements of 
inequitable conduct did the district court hold the patent 
unenforceable.”154 
Ultimately, Regeneron should likely be read to demonstrate that 
district courts have broad discretion in awarding adverse inferences 
based on litigation misconduct, so long as the litigation misconduct 
relates to the underlying inequitable conduct inquiry. However, such a 
reading is also clearly in tension with Therasense. 
3. Judge Newman’s Dissent 
Judge Newman penned a strong dissent, based on her belief that 
her “colleagues appl[ied] incorrect law and add[ed] confusion to 
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precedent.”155 Newman interpreted Therasense to teach that intent to 
deceive cannot be inferred, but must be proven by clear and 
convincing evidence.156 She pointed out that there was “ no 
evidentiary record developed on intent to deceive, with no testimony 
and no opportunity for examination and cross-examination of 
witnesses.”157 In her view, the majority merely “engage[d] in 
innuendo based on its careful selections from documents not admitted 
into evidence . . . thus convict[ing] Regeneron, its counsel, and its 
scientists, with no trial, no evidence, and no opportunity to respond in 
their defense.”158 However, the majority emphasized that direct 
evidence of intent was not required, and that intent may be inferred 
“where the applicant engages in a ‘a pattern of lack of candor,’ 
including where the applicant repeatedly makes factual 
representations ‘contrary to the true information he had in his 
possession.’”159  
Judge Newman also disagreed with the majority on the 
materiality of the references, believing that neither the district court 
nor the majority had established that the references led to 
unpatentability. Instead, the district court stated, and she agreed, that 
the references disclosed only “motivations, benefits, and cumulative 
teachings.”160 However, in Judge Newman’s view, this still did not 
amount to but-for materiality, “whether taken alone, or with the cited 
references.”161  
4. The Regeneron Majority Versus Dissent on Aptix 
Decision 
Judge Newman based her dissent largely on the Court’s prior 
decision in Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc.162 In her 
view, Aptix instructed that “litigation misconduct in the infringement 
suit ‘does not infect, or even affect’ the patent right” and that the 
majority erred in “‘infecting’ its analysis of inequitable conduct with 
counsel’s purported litigation misconduct years later in the 
infringement trial.”163 However, the majority found that in the case at 
                                                             
 155. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1365 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 1365. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 1351 (citing Apotex Inc. v. UCB, Inc., 763 F.3d 1354, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2014)). 
 160. Id. At 1396. 
 161. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1369 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 162. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, Inc., 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 163. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1367 (Newman, J., dissenting) (quoting Aptix, 269 F.3d at 
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2018] THE RETURN OF THE PLAGUE  351 
hand, Aptix was inapposite.164 In that case, Aptix submitted falsified 
engineering notebooks to the court during litigation, and there was 
absolutely no evidence of misconduct in the patent’s prosecution, or 
that the company participated in any wrongful conduct during 
litigation or before the PTO.165 Where the district court erred was in 
declaring the patent unenforceable as a form of relief solely for the 
litigation misconduct, which it felt “necessary for deterring Aptix and 
other parties from engaging in future misconduct.”166 The Circuit 
Court emphasized the flexibility of the unclean hands doctrine, upon 
which the inequitable conduct defense is based, declaring that “[t]here 
is no limit inherent in the doctrine of unclean hands that prevents 
declaring a patent unenforceable based on the post-issuance conduct 
of the party seeking relief.”167 However, despite the doctrine’s 
flexibility, the Court found that it “does not reach out to extinguish a 
property right based on misconduct during litigation to enforce the 
right.”168  
The Aptix court skipped past an inequitable conduct analysis, 
moving straight to a declaration of unenforceability as a sanction for 
the solely post-prosecution litigation misconduct.169 Unlike Aptix, 
there was evidence that Regeneron had engaged in both pre-and-post-
prosecution misconduct, which led the district court to draw its 
adverse inference based on both types of misconduct.170 In the 
majority’s view, the district court’s sanction was not, as in Aptix, 
punishing Regeneron by holding the patent unenforceable, but instead 
only that an element of the inequitable conduct defense was 
established. The unenforceability of the ’018 patent was not found 
until after Merus proved the remaining elements of inequitable 
conduct.171 
The dissent appears to have equated the ultimate holding in the 
case with the sanction imposed for Regeneron’s litigation misconduct. 
While the adverse inference sanction did ultimately affect the final 
decision of the court on the issue of enforceability, allowing Merus to 
meet its burden to prove inequitable conduct, the sanction itself was 
                                                             
 164. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364. 
 165. Aptix, 269 F.3d at 1371, 1377. 
 166. Id. at 1377-78. 
 167. Id. at 1379-80. 
 168. Aptix, 269 F.3d at 1375. 
 169. See Aptix Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., No. 98-00762, 2000 WL 852813, at 
*32 (N.D. Cal. June 14, 2000), aff’d in part, vacated in part, 269 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 170. Regeneron II, 864 F.3d at 1364 (“Regeneron is accused not only of post-prosecution 
misconduct but also of engaging in inequitable conduct during prosecution.”). 
 171. Id. 
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not non-enforceability. Therefore, it seems that the majority properly 
distinguished Aptix since the actions of the parties and the remedy 
declared by the court was different than that of the case at hand.  
IV. THE IMMEDIATE IMPACT OF REGENERON AT DISTRICT 
COURT 
As of February 2018, only two district court cases have cited to 
the Regeneron decision for the proposition that courts may draw an 
adverse inference regarding the prosecution and scope of a patent 
based on misconduct during litigation. Because neither case reached a 
conclusion regarding whether the patents at issue were unenforceable 
for inequitable conduct, neither case demonstrates a significant 
departure from the law prior to Regeneron. Although there are a 
limited number of cases that have come out in this area since 
Regeneron, it appears that the Federal Circuit’s decision in Regeneron 
has emboldened more courts to consider a wider range of misconduct 
to draw adverse inferences regarding inequitable conduct to limit or 
terminate patent rights. 
The first district court decision that cited Regeneron relied on its 
precedent to support an inference of specific intent for failing to 
disclose relevant prior art during prosecution. In Shuffle Tech 
International LLC v. Sci. Games Corp., the patent owner Scientific 
Games moved for summary judgment contending, among other 
things, that no reasonable juror could infer that the original patentee 
had specific intent to defraud the PTO during the prosecution of the 
disputed patent.172 Shuffle Tech alleged that the original patent owner 
had committed inequitable conduct by failing to disclose relevant 
pieces of prior art during the prosecutions and reexaminations of two 
of its patents.173 Shuffle Tech further alleged that Scientific Games 
violated antitrust laws under Walker Process, by utilizing a patent 
obtained through intentional fraud on the USPTO to create or 
preserve a monopoly.174 To establish of the original patent owner’s 
intent to defraud the USPTO, Shuffle Tech presented evidence that 
the patent owner had made contradictory statements during 
prosecution of the patent. The court found this evidenced that the 
patent owner had a “lack of candor” and knowingly misrepresented 
the state of the prior art to the PTO. Citing Regeneron for authority, 
                                                             
 172. Shuffle Tech Int’l LLC v. Sci. Games Corp., No. 1:15-cv-3702, 2017 WL 3838096, 
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the court then drew an adverse inference of fraudulent intent.175 The 
court found that Shuffle Tech had provided sufficient evidence to 
support a finding that SHFL acted with fraudulent intent in omitting 
the withheld references at issue, and that a reasonable jury could infer 
from that “lack of candor” that the omission was for the purpose of 
defrauding the PTO.176 While Shuffle Tech is unlike Regeneron in that 
the patent owner’s misconduct was before the USPTO and there was 
no evidence of litigation misconduct, it is notable that the court cited 
Regeneron to support drawing an adverse inference, which appears to 
be directly contrary to the primary holding of the Federal Circuit in 
Therasense. 
The second district court decision case that citied Regeneron did 
so to support the proposition that mere discovery disputes during 
litigation could be used to infer specific intent. In Supernus 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. TWi Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the plaintiff 
alleged that TWi’s generic drug product would infringe Supernus’ 
patents.177 Supernus sought discovery regarding TWi’s selection of a 
particular drug ingredient. While TWi argued that the ingredient was 
selected for routine reasons, it also invoked attorney-client privilege 
to protect information regarding TWi’s selection of the ingredient 
from discovery. The parties submitted briefing as to whether the 
Court should draw an adverse inference from TWi’s invocation of the 
attorney-client privilege. Citing Regeneron for support, the court 
stated that it was “tempted” to draw an adverse inference from 
“TWi’s caginess on the issue” and TWi’s use of privilege as a sword 
and shield. However, the court ultimately declined to draw an adverse 
inference because there was other “ample evidence” establishing why 
TWi chose to use the ingredient in its generic drug.178 
V. THE PRACTICAL IMPACT OF REGENERON: TIPS FOR 
PRACTITIONERS 
While the Regeneron decision did not explicitly change the 
standard for inequitable conduct, it appears to have created a new way 
for defendants to prove the elements of the affirmative defense. 
Because the Regeneron decision implicated both the patent 
prosecution counsel and litigation counsel in its finding, prosecutors 
and litigators should each consider taking precautionary measures to 
                                                             
 175. Shuffle Tech, 2017 WL 3838096, at *13. 
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 177. Supernus Pharm., Inc. v. TWi Pharm., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 3d 490, 490 (D.N.J. Sept. 
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avoid future claims of inequitable conduct. The following tips and 
considerations can help attorneys guard against new claims of 
inequitable conduct spurred by Regeneron. 
A. Disclosures During Prosecution 
Having open and honest communications with the USPTO 
during prosecution is fundamental to avoiding a finding of inequitable 
conduct. As discussed in greater depth above, prosecutors should be 
careful to avoid understating the relevance or importance of prior art 
before the USPTO. By broadening the adverse inference analysis, 
Regeneron may encourage some defendants to rely on arguments that 
the prosecuting attorney mischaracterized prior art during the 
prosecution of the asserted patent. To avoid these types of assertions, 
prosecutors may want to adopt an overly candid approach in making 
assertions and disclosures to the USPTO, erring on the side of over-
disclosure and literal accuracy when characterizing prior art. Creating 
a clear record of good faith efforts to disclose accurate information 
during the patent prosecution process is also important. As discussed 
in further detail below, the same guiding principles hold true for 
litigation counsel. 
As discussed previously, all persons substantively involved in 
the prosecution of a patent application, including both the inventors 
and their attorneys, owe a duty of candor to the USPTO to disclose 
“all information known . . . to be material to patentability.”179 
However, as we have seen in the cases discussed above, what defines 
“known” and “material to patentability” is often subjective and rarely 
clear. Too often prosecutors fail to submit thorough Information 
Disclosure Statements (IDSs) during prosecution, which makes the 
resulting issued patents more vulnerable to inequitable conduct claims 
and arguments that the patent is unenforceable. When determining 
which references to submit in an IDS, applicants must balance 
numerous strategic concerns regarding administrative burdens and 
internal costs, as well as concerns regarding possible future litigation 
risks. While failure to disclose material art may lead to claims that the 
applicant hid important art, disclosing an overly long list including 
possibly irrelevant references could lead to claims that the applicant 
intentionally buried important references in a long list. 
                                                             
 179. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (“Each individual associated with the filing and prosecution of a 
patent application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the Office . . . . [All 
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Hypothetically, applicants should endeavor to disclose all reasonably 
relevant references that are not cumulative. However, determining 
what a patent examiner would consider cumulative is challenging, 
and failing to disclose a reference that is clearly cumulative is likely 
to be seized upon by litigation counsel as evidence of inequitable 
conduct. Because claims of burying are less common and harder to 
prove than claims of hiding, and additionally because claims are 
construed to have their broadest reasonable interpretation during 
prosecution, applicants should err on the side of disclosure if a 
reference is arguably relevant, even if it appears to be cumulative.180 
Note that intent is critical to the inequitable conduct analysis, and an 
applicant should not submit irrelevant or cumulative art with the 
intent to bury relevant references. 
Patent applicants should also pay close attention to references 
cited by foreign patent offices during the prosecution of any related 
foreign applications.181 Disclosure of these references will support 
later claims that the applicant made good faith efforts to comply with 
their duty of candor and therefore did not intend to deceive the 
USPTO. Additionally, when citing non-English references in IDS, 
applicants should provide an English translation of at least the most 
material parts of the foreign reference to aid examiners.182 Ideally, the 
best practice would be to provide a translation of the entire reference 
to avoid charges that the partial translation was an effort to mislead 
the examiner by pointing them away from relevant untranslated 
portions. However, due to the high costs associated with the 
translation of technical documents, a full translation is often not 
economically feasible. 
Complying with the duty of disclosure can be a burdensome task 
for applicants, particularly where foreign counterparts or pending 
domestic family members necessitate numerous IDS filings. 
Nonetheless, thorough and accurate information disclosure aids the 
                                                             
 180. Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“When a reference 
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USPTO’s examination of the application and can ultimately add 
substantial value to the patent. Patent examiners are allotted very little 
time for their prior art searches, and thus clear and accurate 
disclosures by applicants help the examiners analyze the state of the 
art in a more complete and timely manner. Extensive disclosure 
benefits the applicant because all references properly cited to the 
examiner are listed on the face of the issued patent and are presumed 
to have been reviewed by the examiner.183 If the patent is litigated, 
courts and juries give considerable deference to the patent office, 
making it difficult to invalidate the patent over the listed prior art. 
Consequently, patents with thorough disclosures of prior art are also 
more valuable for sale and licensing because knowledgeable buyers 
and licensees recognize that full disclosure during prosecution 
process tends to support the presumption of validity of the patent.  
When preparing Information Disclosure Statements, it is 
essential that practitioners have systems in place to ensure that all 
relevant references (prior art or otherwise) are considered for 
disclosure. To avoid any appearance of impropriety, careful planning 
prior to submitting the IDS will help to protect the client and 
practitioner against claims of inequitable conduct. For most clients, 
time and money are exceedingly important, which may dictate filing 
strategies that reduce these burdens. For example, when prosecution a 
group of related patent applications (for example, a group of 
application claiming priority to a common parent), it may be 
advisable to file consolidated IDSs at periodic intervals citing art that 
is relevant to each member of the group. Doing so may allow the 
applicant to cross-cite all relevant information without spending more 
than necessary to file IDS forms. 
Finally, note that the applicant’s disclosure obligations continue 
throughout the prosecution of the patent application. Thus, applicants 
should consider continually submitting IDSs to disclose additional 
relevant and non-cumulative prior art discovered during the 
prosecution of foreign patent applications, international patent 
searches, or any other search or analysis conducted during the 
pendency of a patent application. 
B. Post-Allowance Disclosures 
Upon receipt of a Notice of Allowance, an applicant should 
review the application and file history to confirm that all potentially 
relevant documents were disclosed in IDSs, and that the examiner 
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considered all cited references in those IDSs. To ensure a clear record 
that the examiner considered all of the documents disclosed in the 
IDS, the applicant should verify that the examiner initialed all prior 
art cited in the IDS filings. If not, it may be appropriate to contact the 
examiner and request that an initialed IDS be issued and included in 
the file history. Although an issued patent is presumptively valid, that 
presumption is strengthened by evidence that the examiner considered 
all relevant prior art references cited during the prosecution of the 
patent. Furthermore, should a defendant attempt to assert a cited prior 
art reference against the patent during litigation, the court and jury 
will likely give substantial deference to the USPTO’s determination 
that the patent was valid over the cited art.  
The applicant’s duty to disclose all potentially relevant 
documents continues until the day the patent issues. 184 Therefore, if 
an applicant becomes aware of potentially relevant documents at any 
time prior to the issuance of the patent, the applicant must submit 
those documents to the PTO in an IDS. This scenario of accidental 
nondisclosure most often occurs when a patent is examined quickly 
and the Notice of Allowance arrives before the applicant submitted all 
of the relevant documents for the IDS to the USPTO. Thus, post-
allowance review should include careful consideration of all 
submitted IDSs and prior art known to the applicant. This cautious 
review and submission process may prevent the expense of litigation 
against allegations of inequitable conduct for failing to disclose 
known material references. Addition of prior art references to the 
prosecution history also gives applicants the opportunity to record in 
the prosecution history arguments showing validity of the patent over 
disclosed references and/or amend claims to ensure validity over the 
disclosed art. 
Note, however, the receipt of a Notice of Allowance officially 
closes prosecution of the patent application, and IDSs filed after the 
Notice of Allowance may not be considered by the Examiner. As 
such, if the applicant realizes that not all potentially relevant 
documents have been submitted to the PTO, the applicant can file an 
IDS with a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) to reopen 
prosecution and have the documents considered. However, if the 
applicant has already paid the issue fee for the allowed application, 
then the applicant may need to file a petition to withdraw the 
application from issuance and then file a supplemental IDS for the 
examiner’s consideration. In both cases, reopening prosecution and 
submitting the IDS will likely substantially delay the ultimate 
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issuance of the patent. Thus, patent applicants should weigh the 
possibility of delay against the relevance and importance of the newly 
disclosed reference. As another alternative, the USPTO has 
implemented a Quick Path IDS (QPIDS) pilot program which 
eliminates the requirement that an applicant file a Request for 
Continued Examination (RCE) in order to add an information 
disclosure statement (IDS). Under the QPIDS pilot program, the 
USPTO will issue a corrected notice of allowability instead of 
reopening prosecution if the examiner determines that no information 
in the newly submitted IDS necessitates further prosecution of the 
patent application.185 
Note that if the patent issues and patentee discovers that a person 
associated with the prosecution of the patent knew of materially 
relevant information during the pendency of the application and failed 
to disclose it to the USPTO, the patentee may want to consider filing 
a request for supplemental examination, which is referred to as ex 
parte reexamination.186 In order to ensure a clear record of good faith 
and compliance, an applicant can request the USPTO to conduct the 
supplemental examination of the patent to correct, reconsider, or 
consider information that may be relevant to the patent in question.  
During the reexamination process, the USPTO may confirm the 
validity of patent claims over newly disclosed prior art or the patent 
holder can amend claims as necessary to overcome the newly 
disclosed prior art. Because reexamination is often complete within a 
year, it may even be used to change the scope of claims for a patent 
that is currently being asserted, resulting in a reissued patent with new 
claims in the middle of litigation. When reissue of a patent changes 
the scope of the claims, parties that practiced or prepared to practice 
the claims prior to reissue may have intervening rights to continue 
practicing the patent claims. But any information considered during 
the supplemental examination would be added to the record of 
information that was submitted and considered during the prosecution 
of the patent, and the supplemental examination would thus eliminate 
a defendant’s ability to claim in a future infringement litigation that 
the applicant hid the information from the USPTO. Thus, even if the 
patentee believes the reference was merely cumulative, reexamination 
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proceedings may help avoid inequitable conduct allegations by 
creating a record clarifying that previously-known art is not 
material.187 
Finally, if the patent holder becomes aware of a material 
reference after issuance of the patent, while there is no duty to 
disclose at this point, the patentee still has the option of submitting a 
request for supplemental examination in order to create a record that 
the USPTO considered the prior art and nevertheless still found the 
claims valid.  
C. Pre-Litigation Diligence 
Although Regeneron may change the way courts remedy 
misconduct after a finding of inequitable conduct, the basic 
Therasense two-prong framework has not changed and the party 
asserting the defense still must show both materiality and intent.  
The “but-for” materiality standard for inequitable conduct asks 
courts to analyze whether prior art would have prevented the issuance 
of the patent from the USPTO. Thus, the “broadest reasonable 
interpretation” claim construction standard used during prosecution at 
the USPTO is applied for this analysis. As such, a patent holder’s 
litigation counsel cannot count on a narrow claim construction to 
rebut but-for materiality of a reference. 
While litigation counsel cannot turn back time and change what 
occurred before the USPTO during prosecution, they can take steps to 
avoid adverse inferences based on their own conduct during the 
litigation. Again, honesty with the court as well as opposing counsel 
in discovery and all other stages of litigation is the best rule of thumb 
to avoid “intent” accusations. As seen in Regeneron, misuse of 
attorney/client privilege and confidentiality claims can negatively 
impact the litigation and render the asserted patent completely 
unenforceable.  
Prior to asserting a patent, a patent holder’s litigation counsel 
should aim to have a clear and complete understanding of all 
prosecution history for the patent-at-issue. Careful review of 
communications between the patent holder and its prosecution 
counsel should be a critical part of the pre-litigation investigation. 
Litigation counsel should investigate nonprivileged communications 
and documents that could be interpreted as showing deceptive intent 
and weigh when and how to disclose these documents to the court and 
                                                             
 187. Unless the patent holder intentionally misleads the USPTO during the reexamination 
process, as the Federal Circuit found in Am. Calcar, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 768 F.3d 
1185, 1192 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 
360 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.  [Vol. 34 
the opposing party. As Regeneron demonstrated, unreasonable 
attempts to hide these types of documents can be construed as 
misconduct and result in severe consequences even if the alleged 
misconduct has little to do with the prosecution process before the 
USPTO.  
D. Strategic Assertion 
There are obvious benefits to litigating patent disputes that arise 
over patents that were prosecuted by the same firm including an 
expertise in the particular patent and its subject matter, knowledge of 
the background conception and reduction to practice of the invention, 
and knowledge and records of the prosecution history of the patent. 
However, acting as both litigation and prosecution counsel for the 
same patent holder regarding the same patent may also cause genuine 
or perceived conflicts of interest issues, complex privilege issues, 
and/or toll malpractice claims against the patent prosecution counsel. 
For instance, to the extent that a defendant’s inequitable conduct 
claims raise issues of misconduct or legal ethics violations by the 
patent prosecutor, litigation counsel may in certain circumstances be 
faced with choosing to defend a colleague, the patent prosecutor, or a 
client, the patent holder. With respect to privilege, it may be difficult 
to draw the line between litigation privilege and patent prosecution 
privilege, such that waiver of privilege on one matter may be 
construed to waive privilege on the other. Additionally, from a 
practical perspective, it may be difficult to sift through documents to 
identify which are subject to which privilege. Lastly, if a patent 
holder believes its patent prosecution counsel committed malpractice, 
under the “continuous representation doctrine,” the statute of 
limitations on the legal malpractice claim is tolled while the firm 
continues to represent the patent holder, e.g., during the litigation. If 
the patent holder wishes to later bring such a malpractice action 
against the attorney or firm based on the inequitable conduct, 
depending on the particular state’s law, this can mean that even if the 
limitations period would have run, estopping the client from bringing 
the claim, the tolling will allow the claim.188 
Litigation counsel should carefully consider these issues before 
asserting a patent prosecuted by its firm. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Federal Circuit’s ruling in Regeneron seems to demonstrate 
that litigation misconduct may be relevant to the intent analysis, at 
least when the misconduct is closely related to the patent prosecutors’ 
work. In doing so, the decision opens new opportunities for 
defendants asserting inequitable conduct defenses to challenge the 
litigation conduct of the patentee or its counsel. While the court 
considered Regeneron’s litigation misconduct egregious, the 
circumstances that gave rise to it are not uncommon in practice. In 
fact, disputes over the proper scope or waiver of attorney-client 
privilege are inherent to inequitable conduct proceedings, which 
squarely place attorney-client communications and attorney mental 
impressions at issue. By holding that district courts have discretion to 
grant dispositive adverse inferences based on erroneous claims of 
privilege or untimely waivers of privilege, Regeneron invites 
defendants to transform disputes over privilege into affirmative 
arguments in support of an inequitable conduct defense.  
While it seems unlikely that the frequency of the inequitable 
conduct defense will rise to its former plague-like levels, Regeneron 
may still have a significant impact in patent litigation, perhaps 
providing a new shield for defendants to use against unscrupulous or 
overly combative plaintiffs.  
